In many-to-one matching with contracts, agents on one side of the market, e.g., workers, can ful ll at most one contract, while agents on the other side of the market, e.g., rms, may desire multiple contracts. Hat eld and Milgrom [6] showed that when rms' preferences are substitutable and size monotonic, the worker-proposing cumulative o er mechanism is stable and strategy-proof (for workers). 1 Recently, stable and strategy-proof matching has been shown to be possible in a number of real-world se ings in which preferences are not necessarily substitutable (see, e.g., Sönmez and Switzer [13] , Sönmez [12], Kamada and Kojima [7] , and Aygün and Turhan [1]); this has motivated a search for weakened substitutability conditions that guarantee the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms. Hat eld and Kojima [3] introduced unilateral substitutability and showed that when all rms' preferences are unilaterally substitutable (and size monotonic), the cumulative o er mechanism is stable and strategy-proof. Kominers and Sönmez [9] identi ed a novel class of preferences, called slot-speci c priorities, and showed that if each rm's preferences are in this class, then the cumulative o er mechanism is again stable and strategy-proof. Subsequently, Hat eld and Kominers [4] developed a concept of substitutable completion and showed that when each rm's preferences admit a size monotonic substitutable completion, the cumulative o er mechanism is once more stable and strategy-proof.
e authors appreciate the helpful comments of Ran Eilat, Ravi Jagadeesan, Fuhito Kojima, Shengwu Li, Paul Milgrom, Alvin E. Roth Our results give the rst characterization of su cient and necessary conditions for the guaranteed existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms for many-to-one matching with contracts. Our conditions are strictly weaker than the previously known su cient conditions for the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms; this enables new applications, as well as a new interpretation of prior models of matching with distributional constraints (Hat eld et al. [5] ; see also Kamada and Kojima [7, 8] ). Additionally, our work gives a foundation for the use of cumulative o er mechanisms in many-to-one matching markets with contracts: Whenever a stable and strategy-proof matching mechanism exists, either it must coincide with a cumulative o er mechanism, or its stability and/or strategy-proofness depends crucially on some speci c interdependence of preferences across hospitals that rules out certain unit-demand choice functions. 
